T he growing protectionism of many industrial countries towards agriculture is moving ever closer to centre stage in the current trade policy debate. By assisting their domestic farm sectors, these countries have created a supply far in excess of the demand in their home markets. Helped by export subsidies, the inevitable surpluses are offloaded in the world market, where they have pushed the prices of agricultural products down to a historical low. A large part of the blame for these distortions in agricultural trade is laid at the door of the European Community, but the United States, Japan and not least the group of EFTA countries are also in the dock and are facing demands to liberalise their agricultural policies.
The economic problems facing the farm sector in many industrial countries have reinforced the external pressure to reform na~tional agricultural policies and triggered the search for possible solutions. The agricultural negotiations within GAI-I-and the reform efforts within the EC since the beginning of the eighties reflect moves in this direction. The European Community regards its agricultural policy "reforms" as an adjustment to the reality of the market and hence as its contribution to easing the strains in world agricultural markets and reducing worldwide distortions in resource allocation.
Against this background, the following article attempts to determine whether the current decisions regarding EC agricultural policy are really a fundamental reform leading towards a reduction in protectionism. It discusses first the requirements that indicators must * JohannWoffgang Goethe University, Frankfurt, West Germany.
INTERECONOMICS, July/August 1988 satisfy in order to be able to measure trade distortions and then goes on to make a detailed analysis of the external effects of various attempts to reform the Common Agricultural Policy.
Agriculture has moved increasingly to the centre of attention in the GA'I-I-negotiations that began recently in Uruguay. There is agreement that there should be a gradual and co-ordinated removal of the obstacles to agricultural trade and that the agricultural sector should be integrated more closely into the world economy. Opinions differ, however, on the way to achieve that objective and on the degree of trade distortion attributable to particular countries or country groups. It is ultimately the latter that determines the adjustment pressure exerted on a country in the search for a set of common rules in international agricultural trade. It is therefore understandable that some countries may wish to play down their contribution to the distortion and fragmentation of world trade and seek to lay as much of the blame as possible elsewhere. This can be seen in the debate about appropriate indicators for measuring trade distortions. The choice of an adequate indicator is of far-reaching importance, since it will undoubtedly be used to assess the need to dismantle tariff and non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade. [] show not only the extent to which prices diverge from those in the world market but also the degree of divergence from price movements;
[] in particular, take account of the fact that production and input quotas can permanently alter the priceinduced volume effects.
None of the indicators that have been used meets all of these requirements, so that the choice tends to depend on the issue in hand. If it is a question of measuring the external consequences of national agricultural policies, protection coefficients 1 or producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) 2 are often used. However, even proposals to widen the coverage of these indicators 3 do not resolve the basic problem that not all volume effects on the supply and demand sides are captured or that items are included that have no effect on output, such as transfer payments in the PSE approach.
To cater in particular for trade distortions, a further measure must be devised that directly measures volume effects and is defined in terms of the divergence of trade from the no-intervention state: A percentage representation that is identical for importing and exporting countries would also be conceivable for the purposes of an international comparison for individual products:
where TW stands for the volume of world trade.
Indicators (1) and (2) could also be used to show macro-economic surpluses, which according to conventional indicators only occur in markets with 152 excess supply. Excess capacity can equally well occur in deficit or import markets and hence lead to macroeconomic losses. The above measure would show this irrespective of the country's trade status and would also describe the external consequences of national policies precisely. The higher the figure, the greater the country's contribution to the distortion of world agricultural trade. It should therefore be added to the catalogue of possible indicators for use in the trade policy debate. The idea behind it is not new, but a generalisation of the indicator of "trade creation and trade diversion effects" .4
The Agrimonetary System
The monetary system specific to the European Community's agricultural sector is not generally brought into the discussion of external issues, but in fact the monetary compensatory system and the reform of the agrimonetary system in 1984 have lasting repercussions on agricultural trade, s Separate "green" exchange rates were introduced in 1969 to shield agriculture against the effects of exchange rate changes; for countries with stronger currencies these are above the actual market or central exchange rate, while for member states with weaker currencies they are below. These exchange rate divergences, which are still in force, lead to divergences in EC administered prices and can only be sustained by levying monetary compensatory amounts at the borders. 6 In principle, member countries are committed to the elimination of exchange rate divergences, but progress has been repeatedly set back by changes in central or market exchange rates. This means that in the annual farm price review ministers must deliberate not only on common prices in ECUs but also on the remaining scope for adjustment in the green rates used to translate the common prices into national currencies.
Since production and consumption depend on prices in national currency, an analysis of external trade effects or the impact of protectionism solely on the basis of common prices in ECUs can be misleading, as a comparison of the annual price adjustments in ECUs and in national currencies weighted for all countries and products clearly shows; 7 in national currencies prices
